Abstract-Cross-client data deduplication has been widely used to eliminate redundant storage overhead in cloud storage system. Recently, Abadi et al. introduced the primitive of MLE2 with nice security properties for secure and efficient data deduplication. However, besides the computationally expensive noninteractive zero-knowledge proofs, their fully randomized scheme (R-MLE2) requires the inefficient equality-testing algorithm to identify all duplicate ciphertexts. Thus, an interesting challenging problem is how to reduce the overhead of R-MLE2 and propose an efficient construction for R-MLE2. In this paper, we introduce a new primitive called µR-MLE2, which gives a partial positive answer for this challenging problem. We propose two schemes: static scheme and dynamic scheme, where the latter one allows tree adjustment by increasing some computation cost. Our main trick is to use the interactive protocol based on static or dynamic decision trees. The advantage gained from it is, by interacting with clients, the server will reduce the time complexity of deduplication equality test from linear time to efficient logarithmic time over the whole data items in the database. The security analysis and the performance evaluation show that our schemes are Path-PRV-CDA2 secure and achieve several orders T. Jiang is with the State Key Laboratory of Integrated Service Networks, Xidian University, Xi'an 710071, China (e-mail: jiangt2009@gmail.com).
of magnitude higher performance for data equality test than R-MLE2 scheme when the number of data items is relatively large.
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I. INTRODUCTION
R EMOTE cloud storage have become an indispensable part for various applications in nowadays network, which store a large amount of data and provide the partial data needed. With the rapid growing of cloud storage services, such as cloud storage [2] - [4] , encryption becomes an important technique for protecting the confidentiality of data. Although data encryption provides an important guarantee for the security and privacy of clients' data, it limits the manners of the accessibility and availability of the encrypted data. The limitation of schemes with encrypted data is that, when some special processing applications over the data are needed, such as cross-client data deduplication [5] - [7] , query [8] - [13] , sorting over encrypted data [14] - [18] , the schemes usually become inefficient due to the frequent date encryption and decryption operations. Thus, it is important to design efficient schemes to support secure and efficient computation outsourcing [19] , [20] and storage outsourcing [21] .
Data deduplication enables data storage systems to find and remove duplication within data without compromising its availability. The goal of data deduplication is to store more data in less space by storing and maintaining files (blocks in fine-grained deduplication manner) into a single copy, where the redundant copies of data are replaced by a reference to this copy. It means that data deduplication storage system could reduce the storage size of u clients, who share the same data copy m, from O(u·|m|) to O(u+|m|) if some implementationdependent constants are hidden. Also, clients do not need to upload their data to the cloud storage server when there has been one copy stored, which will not only greatly reduce the communication cost of clients and cloud server, but also save the network bandwidth.
Since the data from different clients is encrypted with different secret keys, it is difficult to conduct ciphertext data deduplication among clients. A secure cross-client deduplication scheme should enable a storage server to detect data deduplication over the data encrypted by different clients, and efficiently prevent the practical attacks [22] - [24] from poor deduplication. Douceur et al. [21] proposed the first solution for secure and efficient data deduplication, and they call it convergent encryption. This idea promoted many significant applications, where various schemes [25] , [26] are implemented or designed based on convergent encryption. Recently, Bellare et al. [27] defined a new primitive, Message-Locked Encryption (MLE), which brought rigor to security deduplication, and captured various security aspects of MLE. Also, they constructed several schemes and provided some detailed analysis over them. To strengthen the notions of security by considering plaintext distributions depending on the public parameter, Abadi et al. [28] proposed two approaches (fully random scheme and deterministic scheme) that are secure even for lock-dependent message in realistic. It answered the question: Can message-locked encryption be secure for lockdependent message? The tag randomization design makes the fully random scheme, R-MLE2 for short, satisfy the standard secure notion of data confidentiality. Also, the overhead in the length of the ciphertext is only additive and independent of the message length.
However, concerning the challenging problem described in [28] , the R-MLE2 scheme is not efficient in the deduplication process because of the comparison of the randomized tag introduced in their paper. It is important to maintain tags for sub-linear deduplication time, since for large data sets linear scans are prohibitive, particularly if they involve a linear number of cryptographic operations. In this paper, we ask whether the R-MLE2 scheme can be much more efficient (with logarithmic or nearly logarithmic deduplication test overhead) in data deduplication for large database while also keep the security properties of the deduplication scheme? We adopt client-server interaction based on randomly balanced tree, mutable tree and self-generation tree to improve the efficiency of our schemes, and design two (static/dynamic) efficient R-MLE2 schemes (μR-MLE2). Both of the designed schemes support efficient data equality test while keeping the security of clients' data by allowing a small number of interaction.
Our scheme is much more practical for cloud data deduplication application compared with R-MLE2. Firstly, our schemes inherit the security enhancement of R-MLE2. In other words, the scheme avoids using tags that are derived deterministically from the message. Secondly, since our schemes reduce the linear duplication test from linear time to sublinear time, they are much more efficient in the duplication test, especially when our scheme is applied to cloud storage server that storing a huge number of data items.
A. Related Works
Convergent encryption [21] ensures data privacy in deduplication. It is a deterministic scheme in which a ciphertext C = E(k, m) is an encryption over message m under a message-dependent key k = h(m), where h is a cryptographic hash function and E is a block cipher. In the deterministic scheme, identical plaintexts will be mapped to one ciphertext. When a client uploads the encrypted plaintext to a server, the server can find the duplicate ciphertext and store only one copy of each data. In this cross-user secure deduplication scheme, the clients do not need to coordinate their actions or consider the existence of other clients who hold identical data copy.
Bellare et al. [27] formalized this primitive as messagelocked encryption, and explored its application in spaceefficient secure outsourced storage. An MLE scheme MLE = (P, K, E, D, T) is composed of five polynomial time algorithms. In MLE, the parameter generation algorithm P is used to generate the public parameter. The key generation algorithm K is used to generate the message-derived key. On inputting a key and a message the encryption algorithm E outputs the ciphertext. The decryption algorithm D reverses the process, whose output is used to compute the ciphertext/plaintext, and the tag generation algorithm T is used to generate the tag of the ciphertext. In the scheme, tag generation maps the ciphertext to a tag and identical plaintext result in one equal tag.
To enhance the security of deduplication and protect the data confidentiality, Bellare et al. [25] showed how to protect the data confidentiality by transforming the predictable message into an unpredictable message. In their system, a third party called key server is introduced to generate the file tag for duplication check. Li et al. [26] addressed the key management issue in block-level deduplication by distributing these keys across multiple servers after encrypting the files. Li et al. [29] considered the hybrid cloud architecture consisting of a public cloud and a private cloud and efficiently solved the problem of deduplication with differential privileges. Yuan and Yu [30] proposed a deduplication system in the cloud storage to reduce the storage size of the tags for integrity check. Recently, Bellare and Keelveedhi [31] proposed a new primitive iMLE, which adopted interaction as a new ingredient to provide privacy for messages that are both correlated and dependent on the public system parameters.
Abadi et al. [28] provided stronger security guarantee for secure deduplication. The first approach was to avoid using tags that are derived deterministically from the message. They designed a fully randomized scheme that supported equality test over ciphertext. More precisely, there were three components in the fully randomized scheme, namely a payload, a tag and a proof of consistency. The tag they designed for plaintext m is computed as τ = (g r , g rh(m) ), where g is the generator of a bilinear group, h is a sufficient strong collisionresistant function, and r is a randomly chosen number. Given two tags τ 1 = (g 1 , h 1 ) and τ 2 = (g 2 , h 2 ), the equality-testing algorithm verifies e(g 1 , h 2 ) ? = e(g 2 , h 1 ). The second approach was a deterministic scheme. It was made secure subject to the condition where the distributions were efficiently samplable using at mostueries to the random oracle. Thus, the security of the second approach was guaranteed by limiting the computational power of the adversarial message distributions.
B. Our Contributions
Building on the above insight, we make several contributions, as follows:
1) This is the first attempt to solve the challenging problem pointed out by [28] "the first scheme (R-MLE2) requires a pairwise application of the equality-testing algorithm to identify all duplicate ciphertexts." We reduce the linear pairing comparison times of the R-MLE2 to nearly logarithmic times. 2) By adopting client-server interaction, we construct two deduplication decision tree structures: static deduplication decision tree and dynamic deduplication decision tree. The static one is suitable for static data, while the dynamic one, based on the self-generation tree, allows data update such as data insertion, deletion and modification. 3) We provide the security and theoretical performance analysis for the proposed schemes, and implement the equality-testing schemes with the existing cryptographic libraries and provide the performance evaluation of our schemes. This is the full version of the paper that has been presented in ACISP 2016 [1] . The main differences from the conference version are as follows: Firstly, introduce some explanations and examples in our paper. Secondly, we add a new section 5 to present the formal security proof. Finally, we use a new section 6 to provide a thorough experimental evaluation of the proposed scheme and compare it with the R-MLE scheme over data equality test.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Bilinear Pairings
Let G and G T be two cyclic multiplicative groups of prime order p. Let g be a generator of G. A bilinear pairing is a mapê : G × G → G T with the following properties:
• Bilinearity: For all u, v ∈ G, and a, b ∈ Z * p , we havê e(u a , v b ) =ê(u, v) ab .
• Non-degeneracy:ê(g, g) = 1. We say that G is a bilinear group if the group action in G can be computed efficiently and there exists a group G T and an efficiently computable bilinear mapê(
Definition 1 (Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) Problem): Given a tuple g, g a , g b , g c ∈ G as input (for unknown randomly chosen a, b, c ∈ Z * p ), compute e(g, g) abc ∈ G T . The BDH problem is hard to solve in G as the assumption in [32] . In other words, G and G T are chosen so that there is no known algorithm for efficiently solving the Diffie-Hellman problem in either G or G T .
B. Decision Trees
A decision tree is a decision support tree-like model, which works by partitioning the data space one attribute at a time. For example, a decision tree consisting of nodes (circles) and branches (lines) is shown in Fig. 1 .
The nodes in the tree correspond to partitioning rules (e.g. conditions in Fig. 1 ), and they are used to decide which branch to take until a leaf node is encountered. A decision tree typically begins with a given first decision called the root node (the black circle). The lines that connect nodes are called branches. Branches that emanate from a decision node are called decision branches with possibly different conditions. A leaf node or a termination node (gray circles) indicates a final outcome for that branch. The decision process walks the tree by starting from the root. Decision trees support three main operations: query, insertion, and deletion.
Query: Find a specific element in the tree. In data deduplication scheme, only one element will be found or no element is found.
Insertion: Insert new elements to a specific position of the decision tree. It is obvious to insert a leaf node, which can also be called node pending. However, we need to consider the relationship of the nodes with the inserted node as a root node, when inserting an intermediate node.
Deletion: Find a specific elements in the tree, and then delete it. Similar to insertion operation, deletion operation needs to consider node relationship if the deleted node is not a leaf node.
C. MLE for Lock-Dependent Message
A message-locked encryption for lock-dependent messages MLE2 [28] is a six-tuple Π = (PPGen, KD, Enc, Dec, EQ, Valid) defined below.
• The parameter generation algorithm PPGen takes as input 1 λ and returns public parameters pp.
• The key derivation function KD takes as input public parameters pp, a message m, and outputs a messagederived key k m .
• The encryption algorithm Enc takes as input public parameters pp, a message m, and a message-derived key k m . It outputs a ciphertext c.
• The decryption algorithm Dec takes as input public parameters pp, ciphertext c, and a secret key k m and outputs either a message m or ⊥.
• The equality algorithm EQ takes as input public parameters pp, and two ciphertexts c 1 and c 2 and outputs 1 if both ciphertexts are generated from the same underlying message.
• The validity-test algorithm Valid takes as input public parameters pp and a ciphertext c and outputs 1 if the ciphertext c is a valid ciphertext.
III. NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS
A. Notation
The set of binary string of length n is denoted as {0, 1} n , and the set of all finite binary strings are denoted as {0, 1} * . We denote the bit length of a given binary string s as |s|. Given two binary strings s 1 and s 2 , the concatenation is written as s 1 ||s 2 . The notation [1, n] denotes the integer set {1, ..., n} with n ∈ N. We denote the output x of an algorithm A as x ← A. Sampling uniformly random from a set X is denoted as x R ← X. Also, A ← B is used to denote the communication between two entity A and B. B(x) denotes the bitwise exclusive or of the digest of x, and the digest of x can be calculated with a secure hash function. Throughout, λ is denoted as the security parameter, and h(·) is modeled as hash function.
B. Security Model and Definitions
Our system consists of the clients and a cloud storage server as shown in Fig. 2 . The clients, who own the data, will outsource and store their encrypted data to the untrusted cloud storage server. We consider the following models and basic properties of our scheme.
Definition 2 (μR-MLE2):
An efficient fully random message-locked encryption scheme with randomized tag is an eight-tuple of polynomial-time algorithms Π = (PPGen, KeyGen, Enc, Dec, TreeInit, EQ, Valid, Dedup) run by a client and a deduplication server.
• pp ← PPGen(1 λ ): The parameter generation algorithm takes 1 λ as input and outputs the public parameter pp.
The key generation algorithm takes the public parameters pp and a message m as inputs, and outputs a message-derived key k m .
The encryption algorithm takes the public parameters pp and the message derived key k m as inputs, and returns a ciphertext c.
The algorithm takes the public parameter pp and the message derived key k m as inputs.
If the algorithm runs successfully, it will return the plaintext m. Otherwise, it will return ⊥.
• ts ← TreeInit(1 λ ): The tree initialization algorithm takes 1 κ as input, and outputs the tree state ts of the current database.
The equality-testing algorithm takes the public parameter pp and the tags τ 1 and τ 2 of two ciphertexts as inputs, and outputs 1 if the tags of the ciphertexts are generated from identical messages.
• {0, 1} ← Valid pp (c): The validity-testing algorithm takes public parameters pp and the ciphertext c as input. It outputs 1 if the ciphertext c is a valid input and 0 otherwise.
The data deduplication algorithm takes the public parameters pp, τ 1 , and tag τ 2 as inputs. It returns whether a duplicate data copy has been found. Intuitively, our scheme conducts data deduplication item by item among clients. A client does not need to upload its encrypted data item to the storage server when there is a duplicate copy stored. Otherwise, the client needs to upload its data. We consider that the server stores a sequence of data {c 1 , ..., c n } and the corresponding tag values {τ 1 , ..., τ n } at some point. When a client, holding message m and its corresponding tag τ , wants to conduct data deduplication, the scheme should efficiently direct to the identical data copy if a duplicate value is stored in the storage server. The decision tree state evolves after each storing (there is no duplication data copy stored in the storage server), from ts 0 to ts n , where ts 0 is the initial state. We define the following properties. 
We now define the security of our scheme, which intuitively says that the scheme must not leak anything besides the bits for deduplication path choosing in the deduplication test tree. The security definition is the Path-PRV-CDA2. The definition says that an adversary cannot distinguish between two test sequences of values as long as the sequences have the same tree path.
Path-PRV-CDA2 Security Game:
The security game between a client and an adversary Adv for security parameter λ proceeds as follows:
The client and the server run μR-MLE2 as constructed, the client and the adversary engage in a number of rounds of interaction (not larger than the height of deduplication decision tree), where the client randomly samples message from real or rand mode.
-At round i , the client will send 1-bit path decision value to the adversary.
-With the additional bit information, the adversary conducts the Path-PRV-CDA2 game, Exp mode ,A (λ), as defined in [28] . -The adversary outputs b. We provide our secure definition of Path-PRV-CDA2 security based on the definition PRV-CDA2 security presented in [28] .
Definition 4 (Path-PRV-CDA2 security): A μR-MLE2 scheme is Path-PRV-CDA2 secure if for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, there exists a negligible function negl(λ) such that
where for each mode ∈ {real, rand} and λ the experiment is from Exp mode ,A (λ). We also define the following two properties for the efficiency analysis of our schemes.
Definition 5 (Efficiency):
We say a μR-MLE2 scheme is efficient, if the equality-test time of the deduplication scheme is sublinear.
Definition 6 (Dynamic):
We say a μR-MLE2 scheme is dynamic, if the scheme can be efficiently added, deleted and changed after the initial outsourcing.
IV. THE μR-MLE2 CONSTRUCTIONS
In this section, we present the general description of our constructions and provide the μR-MLE2 scheme based on static deduplication decision tree and dynamic deduplication decision tree. Also, we discuss some detail properties about our schemes.
A. High Description
Abadi et al. [28] proposed a construction for building fully randomized message-locked encryption scheme based on entropy-based DDH assumption. In the scheme, the "payload" is used to store the encryption of message using some underlying randomized encryption scheme, and the tag is generated from the message. There is a proof of consistency, which proves that the payload and the tag correspond to the same message. A tag for a message m is computed as τ = (g r , g r·h(m) ). Given two tags τ 1 = (g r 1 , g r 1 ·h(m 1 ) ) and τ 2 = (g r 2 , g r 2 ·h(m 2 ) ) the equality algorithm verifieŝ e(g r 1 , g r 2 ·h(m 2 ) ) ? =ê(g r 2 , g r 1 ·h(m 1 ) ). However, the server needs to conduct data equality test over the whole database, which is inefficient for practical utilization. To solve this problem, we provide an efficient scheme. The main trick is that we adopt an interactive way to construct decision tree structures over the deduplication database, where the client who wants to store data needs to conduct a number of interactions with the server to verify whether the data is a duplicate copy. More precisely, the server maintains a decision tree, which stores the storage states of the current database. A client, who wants to store data, will interact with the server, where the server provides the tree state and the client provides a path decision over the decision tree in each communication round. Trivially, given the private key h(m) and some relevant information, the client computes and sends a 1-bit path decision to the server in each step. When there is no duplicate data stored, the node pointer of the state tree will move a null child node of a leaf node. Then, the server will store the data and update the decision tree state.
The first decision tree, based on which the scheme conducts data deduplication test without pairing computation, is a static tree. It means that the deduplication scheme based on the static deduplication decision tree is efficient. However, it does not efficiently support the data insertion and deletion, based on which the deduplication is difficult to support data update. Note that efficient decision tree update is important in practical applications, we design a deduplication decision which supports efficient tree update. Our main trick is to use a self-generation tree constructed from a public seed, where the server verifies whether the data form is identical to the current node in the tree and returns the result to the client then indecently provides the server which node path to take in the next step.
B. The Proposed μR-MLE2 Schemes
In this section, we present the detail construction of our efficient randomized MLE2 (μR-MLE2) based on the definition of fully randomized MLE2 [28] . The scheme μR-MLE2 Π = (PPGen, KeyGen, Enc, Dec, TreeInit, EQ, Valid, Dedup) is polynomial in the security parameter. Since our schemes are based on R-MLE2, we omit some construction details of the algorithms in [28] , and provide only the related three algorithms as follows:
• Tree initialization algorithm ts ← TreeInit(1 λ ): It initializes server state st with static/dynamic deduplication decision tree and returns st.
=ê(g 2 , h 1 ) and outputs 1 if and only ifê(
On input the public parameters pp, τ 1 , and tag τ 2 , it calls the algorithm EQ at each node in a tree path until the leaf node if 0 ← EQ. It outputs 0 when all the EQ test output 0. Otherwise it outputs 1. We design two equality test algorithms based on the static and dynamic deduplication decision tree, respectively. The static one is much more efficient, which does not need to conduct expensive pairing computation. The dynamic one is efficient in deduplication decision tree operations, which allows server side data insertion and deletion. Also, the dynamic one will further reduce the communication rounds between clients and the server.
Static Deduplication Decision Tree: Fig. 2 provides an example of storing m * based on static deduplication decision tree. A client, with message m * , wants to conduct secure deduplication. It generates the corresponding tag If b = 0, the server moves the pointer to its left child. Otherwise, it moves the current pointer to its right child. Then, return to step 1.1. The algorithm stops, when the server receives "duplication find" or it needs to move the pointer to an empty node. τ = (g r * , g r * ·h(m * ) ) over message m * . Also, the storage server stores the deduplication data table and maintains its corresponding deduplication decision tree. As shown in Algorithm 1, the scheme based on the static deduplication decision tree supports efficient query, leaf insertion, and leaf deletion operations. In the scheme, the tag comparison query path is generated according to the data storage sequence of clients. Since the path to each node is decided by each node in the path, the static deduplication decision tree only supports query, inserting/delete data at the leaf nodes. When conducting an intermediate node insertion/deletion, the server needs to reinsert all the nodes with the inserted/deleted node as a root node. Since these nodes may come from different clients, it is very difficult for the server to conduct intermediate node insertion/deletion. Dynamic Deduplication Decision Tree: Fig. 3 provides an example of storing m * based on dynamic deduplication decision tree. The dynamic deduplication decision tree is a self-generation tree, where the seed s 0 of the tree is a public parameter generated by the server. The left(right) child of node with s 0b 1 
..b i−1 ||b i ). Then it computes b i = B(h(m)||s 0b 1 ···b i−1 ).
(The initial seed is s 0 .) 2.5 Client →Server: The client sends b i+1 to the server. 2.6 Server: The server moves the current pointer over the tree according to b i+1 . If b i+1 = 0, the server moves the pointer to its left child. Otherwise, it moves the node to its right child. Then, go to step 2.3. The algorithm stops as described in algorithm 1.
be called server-oriented deduplication scheme, where the deduplication test is conducted by the storage server. It hides the deduplication decision tree structure stored in the storage server, which will defeat the security problem in static deduplication scheme.
In the scheme based on dynamic deduplication decision tree, the seed of self-generation tree is a public parameter. The tree construction relies on the self-generated hash value s 0b 1 ...b i in self-generation tree, and clients can generate the tree paths themselves of the owned data items. More precisely, the path decision of dynamic deduplication scheme is decided according to b = B (h(m)||s 0b 1 ...b i ) , which is independent of data storage sequence. The insertion/deletion operations of leaf nodes are obvious. However, the server needs the assistant from the client who own the data items. For example, to insert an intermediate node at a certain position of the data tree path, the server first conducts the complement operation and moves the existing data to a leaf node with the help of the data owner. Then, it inserts the specified data to the empty position that storing the previous data item. To delete a node, firstly delete the current node. Then, choose an appropriate leaf node with the deleted node in it path and insert it to the position of the deleted node. It is obvious that, in this scheme, only the intermediate node insertion operation needs the help from an additional client. Thus, it is efficient compared with the scheme based on static deduplication decision tree over decision tree operation. With dynamic deduplication tree, we are able to improve the efficiency of our scheme by conducting tree balancing as illustrated in Appendix B. To further reduce the communication round, the client could compute and send multiple bits to the server each time. Also, the client could reduce some computational overhead of the hash value generation by storing some hash elements of the self-generation tree.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Theorem 1: Our deduplication schemes are correct in data equality testing.
Proof: (Correctness) We assume that the storage server is honest but curious, and it strictly follows the protocol and constructs the deduplication decision tree. The correctness property required of the scheme is straightforward: equality should finally return only the right tags that exist at the server and the equality test algorithm will finally output the correct result.
Firstly, we need to prove that the client will get the right tree path. In scheme based on the static deduplication decision tree, if two messages are m and m , we get path decision bit b = B(g r i ·h(m) ) and b = B(g r i ·h(m ) ) for m and m , respectively. If m = m , we get b = b . Since the entrance of each tree path is the root of the decision tree, we will get the same tree path if the tree is deterministic. We need to remark that the scheme based on the static deduplication decision tree does not allow the server to change the tree construction, except adding leaf nodes. Thus, it is difficult to conduct any optimization the equality test over the deduplication database. In scheme based on the dynamic deduplication decision tree, since the tree is self-generated, it is obvious that s α = s β if α = 0b 1 g r i , g r i ·h(m ) ). It is obvious that the equation holds only when m = m . The interaction of the client and server will reach a final deduplication test result as defined in correctness definition.
Theorem 2: Our μR-MLE2 scheme is Path-PRV-CDA2 secure.
Proof: Consider any adversary A and any two sequences of values
The view of A consists of the information the server receives in the security experiment. The first is to use the security of R-MLE2 which is PRV-CDA2 secure. Then, we examine the information the adversary learns in case when the client uploads v and v , and show that this information is information-theoretically the same when the uploaded message is of the same path.
For this goal, we proceed inductively in the number of values to be uploaded. The base case is when no value is uploaded and we can see that A starts off with the same information. Now considering that after i steps, we show that the information after i + 1 steps also remains the same.
We have two possibilities. The first possibility is that v i is in the deduplication table. Then the encoding of v i is also in the deduplication table because v and v have the same tree path relation. In this case, the client does not give any more information to A. The second possibility is that the encoding of v i is not in the deduplication table. Since v and v have the same order relation, the path down in the tree taken by client and A must be the same. Also, the only information the client gives to the server is which path to take in deduplication decision tree, which is also the same for both cases. Therefore, A receives the same information in both cases, and hence is Path-PRV-CDA2 secure, which leaks bits no more than the tree height of the deduplication decision tree.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we provide theoretical and piratical efficiency analysis of the proposed schemes and give a comparison with scheme [28] .
A. Theoretical Analysis
In Appendix A, we discuss the theoretical results over our decision tree. Also, Appendix B provides the tree optimization from deduplication tree balancing. Based on these analysis, Table I and Table II illustrate the comparison among the three schemes in terms of both asymptotic computation and communication complexity and actual execution time. In our computation analysis, Hash denotes hash operation mapping a bit-string to a designed length value, Mul denotes a multiplication operation, Exp denotes the exponentiation operation in G, and Pair denotes the pairing operation. In our communication analysis, we consider the bit-length of the content that is needed to transfer between the client and the server. In our analysis, SND and RCV denote the overhead of sending and receiving a message with a certain length respectively.
As shown in Table I and Table II , the client needs to conduct one-time tag generation and transmission. Then, the server will use pairing computation over the whole database to realize the equality test. More precisely, the computation and communication overhead of the server are O (1) and O(n) , respectively.
The scheme based on static deduplication decision tree needs to fetch the tags in the path of deduplication decision tree and verify whether there is a duplicate copy of data stored in the server. Then, it sends a 1-bit path decision information to the server for choosing the path over the deduplication decision tree. The server just provides the tag values for the client according to the 1-bit path decision information each time. Since the static scheme is client side equality test, the scheme does not need the expensive pairing computation. Instead, compared with the scheme based on dynamic deduplication decision tree, the scheme based on the static one needs much more communication overhead in each communication round.
The scheme based on dynamic deduplication decision tree, will greatly reduce both the communication and computation overhead of the client. More precisely, the client will only compute the path decision bit with the seeds of self-generation tree and send it to the server each time. The server will conduct the expensive equality test based on bilinear pairing. The maximum communication rounds of our schemes are decided by the deduplication decision tree height h, while not the whole data items n stored in the server. Actually, with the selfgeneration tree, the client could send multiple bits to help the server to conduct path decision each time, which will further reduce the communication rounds of the scheme. Compared with the scheme based on static deduplication decision tree, the client conducts lightweight hash operations and leaves the expensive pairing computation to the server.
Remark 1: Since our schemes are correct, the maximum equality test times of our schemes are the height of the deduplication decision tree. According to the theoretical analysis of the deduplication decision tree height in the Appendix A, our scheme is efficient. As the tree updating and the tree balancing discussed in the appendix, it is obvious that the scheme based on the dynamic deduplication decision tree is a dynamic scheme. For data deletion, the server could directly delete the relation between the deduplication decision tree and the data item. For data insertion, if a node is empty, the server will just insert the data item. Otherwise, the server needs the owner of the data to move the data to a leaf node of the tree according to the deduplication policy and then it will insert the data element to an appropriate position of the decision tree.
B. Implementation
We implement the equality-test algorithms of R-MLE2 and μR-MLE2 schemes based on the Pairing Based Cryptography library (PBC) [33] . In our implementations, we instantiate the bilinear map with type-A pairing (λ = 512), which offers a level of security that is equivalent to 1024-bit DLOG [33] . For all the schemes, we instantiate the hash function with SHA-1 provided by the OpenSSL cryptographic library [34] . In our scheme, we construct the tree structure with C language. We provide the efficiency analysis of the schemes based on some random values. For comparison, the algorithms run by the storage server and the clients are both executed on a machine with Linux OS, 2.70GHz Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4600U CPU and 8GB RAM.
Since the deduplication decision tree height (the maximum path length) is closely related to equality test time of deduplication, Fig. 4 shows the height of deduplication decision tree generated from random values. Since the equality-test times of R-MLE2 scheme are linear with the data item, we use a tree where each node has only one child. In our μR-MLE2 schemes, the height of our randomly generated deduplication decision tree is nearly logarithmic to the data items as shown in Fig. 4 . We also get the result based on our simulation that the tree height is around 20 for 100,000 data item, which is not provided in Fig. 4 .
We provide the time to generate the deduplication decision tree in Fig. 5 . It is obvious that, to generate a tree with different data, our scheme achieves 1-2 orders of magnitude higher performance than the state-of-the-art R-MLE2 scheme even when there are less than 1000 data items in the tree. Also, our schemes will be much more efficient when applied over large data set deduplication.
Since the data items and the deduplication decision tree are randomly generated, the storage time of each data item is usually not the same each time. Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 show some detail about deduplication time of our static and dynamic schemes. It is obvious that, the deduplication time for the sequential test is nearly logarithmic to the number of data items, and it is nearly linear for the random test. Since the client only needs to calculate the hash values, the client time cost in dynamic μR-MLE2 is not obvious compared to the expensive pairing computation at the server. Fig. 8 shows the deduplication time comparison of our μR-MLE2 schemes. The static μR-MLE2 scheme needs less deduplication testing time than the dynamic one, since the client does not need to conduct pairing operations each time. The advantage of the dynamic scheme is that, the client only needs to conduct the lightweight hash function and leave the expensive pairing computation to the storage server.
VII. CONCLUSION
Interactive avenues are explored to improve the efficiency of fully randomized secure deduplication scheme R-MLE2. To achieve secure and efficient data deduplication, we construct two interactive schemes based on static and dynamic deduplication decision tree structures, respectively. The static deduplication decision tree is constructed based on the random elements from the client, which does not allow the tree to update. However, the dynamic deduplication decision tree is constructed based on the designed self-generation tree, which allows the server to conduct tree update and some other optimization. The security, theoretical and practical performance analysis show that our scheme is Path-PRV-CDA2 secure and it achieves several orders of magnitude higher performance than the state-of-the-art schemes in practical data deduplication.
APPENDIX A TREE HEIGHT Most operations on a deduplication decision tree take time directly proportional to the height of the tree, so it is desirable to keep the height small. A binary tree with height h can contain at most 2 h+1 − 1 nodes. It follows that a tree with n nodes and height h where h ≥ log n 2 . We model the hash function as random oracle in this paper. Since the input g r·h(m) each time is random in our first deduplication decision tree construction, we consider g r·h(m) as a random bit-string. Then, we also consider b = B(g r·h(m) ) as random bit.
In the self-generation binary tree, we consider the adopted hash function from a family of hash functions which maps the value of each key from some universe U into m.
Then, we can model any value in the self-generation tree as random value. Finally, we model b = B(s||h(m)) as random bit.
The two deduplication decision trees constructed in our scheme are similar to the random binary trees widely studied to provide information useful in evaluating algorithms based on this storage structure. In our constructions, we model the hash value as the random input and adopt the compressed binary b to make path decision.
We construct a binary search tree from a sequence of n different numbers by inserting them in the random order into an initially empty tree as shown in our two constructions. Let H n be the height of the constructed tree on n nodes. As n approaches ∞, there exist constants α = 4.311... and β = 1.953..., such that the expected value E(H n ) = αlnn − βlnlnn + O(1), and the variety of H n is V ar(H n ) = O(1) [35] . Here, ln is the natural logarithm and log is the base 2 logarithm. The expected height of the two deduplication decision trees is of logarithmic equality-testing time, which means that our schemes are efficient.
APPENDIX B DEDUPLICATION DECISION TREE BALANCING
In computer science, an optimal binary search tree (BST) is usually used to provide the smallest possible search time for a given sequence of accesses. We consider the server side optimization over our dynamic deduplication decision tree, since it could gradually collect and record the deduplication access frequency of all the elements stored in the database. Actually, it is not practical for us to conduct tree balancing over the static deduplication decision tree, as we will never know how the current storing sequence and frequency affect the structure of deduplication decision tree in the future. Also, if the server wants to change the position of a node in static deduplication for performance optimization, all the first data owners relevant to the node's children need to take part into this procedure. Thus, we just consider tree balancing over the scheme based on dynamic deduplication decision tree, where the tree can be modified at any time, typically by permitting tree rotations.
By generalizing the problem, we consider not only the frequencies with which a successful search is completed, but also the frequencies where unsuccessful searches occur. In our deduplication tree, we consider there are n elements B 1 , ..., B n and 2n + 1 frequencies β 1 , ..., β n , α 1 , ..., α n with β i + α j = 1, where β i is the frequency of encountering element B i , and α j is the frequency of encountering an element which lies between B j and B j +1 as defined in [36] . In the dynamic deduplication decision tree with n interior nodes and n + 1 leaves, as defined in [37] , the weighted path length of the tree is
Let n = 2 k − 1, β i = 2 −k + ε i , with n i=1 ε i = 2 −k and ε 1 > ε 2 > · · · > ε n > 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and α j = 0 for 1 ≤ j ≤ n. In a balanced tree for the above frequency distribution, as shown in [37] , its weighted path length is
We get β i > β j where β i is the frequency of encountering element B i and β j is the frequency of B i 's child node B j . The weighted path length sum of the two node is P. If we exchange the position of element B i and B j , the sum of the weighted path length of the two node is P . Since the distance of node B i from the root is always smaller than that of its children, we have b i < b j . Then, we get
Equation 3 shows that we will get smaller weighted path length, if we move the element with larger frequency closer to the root. Thus, the server will be able to optimize the tree structure by moving element closer to the root in our scheme based on dynamic deduplication decision tree. 
